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RESUMEN
Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, el dictador espan˜ol Francisco
Franco limito´, por razones polı´ticas, el nu´mero de trabajadores civiles espan˜oles
enviados a Alemania. Aunque se pacto´ el envı´o de 100.000 trabajadores a
Alemania, el nu´mero actual nunca supero´ los 9.550. Consecuentemente, el
impacto de trabajadores espan˜oles en la economı´a de guerra alemana fue
bajo. Este artı´culo muestra que, limitando las transferencias de trabajadores
a Alemania, Francisco Franco estaba actuando en contra a sus propios
incentivos econo´micos, ya que el Gobierno de Espan˜a recibı´a una comisio´n
de las remesas. Al limitar el nu´mero de trabajadores, Franco cedio´ a la
presio´n aliada, que estimulaba minimizar la cooperacio´n con Alemania. Para
dar soporte a este argumento, e´ste artı´culo ofrece estimaciones actualizadas
del nu´mero de trabajadores, sus calificaciones y sus remesas. El artı´culo
tambie´n brinda las primeras estimaciones del coste y beneficio de este
programa para el Gobierno espan˜ol.
Palabras clave: Espan˜a, alemania, transferencias del trabajo, control
de cambios, la segunda guerra mundial
1. INTRODUCTION
Throughout much of the first half of the Second World War in Europe,
Hitler attempted to bring Spanish dictator Francisco Franco into the Axis
alliance (Preston 1990, chapter 4). The programmes organised during this
period include Spanish military and labour contributions to the German war
effort. On August 22, 1941, representatives of Germany and Spain signed the
Acuerdo hispano-alema´n para el empleo de trabajadores espan˜oles en Alemania
(Spanish-German Accord for the Employment of Spanish Workers in
Germany) at the Spanish Foreign Ministry in Madrid1. This established a
system of government-organized labour transfers, the second from a neutral
nation to a belligerent one, following an Italian-German programme established
in September 1939 (Deutsche Arbeitsfront 1941, p. 194ff). The Germans wanted
Spain to provide 400,000 workers, of whom 100,000 were expected to be dis-
patched by Spain over the first 6 months2. For many, it represented a step
towards Spanish co-belligerency (see Herna´ndez Sandoica and Moradiellos
2002; Bowen 2000, pp. 77-102); however, despite considerable pressure, the
1 Archives of the Ministerio de Asunto Exteriores y de Cooperacio´n (AMAEC), R2225/7,
Agreement dated August 22, 1941.
2 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group (RG) 242/T-77/243/
987071-72, German memo marked «Vermerk fu¨r Chef», dated November 10, 1941.
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Spanish government provided at most only 9,550 workers. With a maximum of
36,529 million workers in Germany in May 1943, Spain was a minor con-
tributor to the German war effort3. Given its negligible effect on the war, the
conflicting logic of promising to aid the Axis war effort without providing the
promised resources raises the question of what the Spanish government
intended to accomplish with this programme.
Works by Rafael Garcı´a Pe´rez and Jose´ Luis Rodrı´guez Jime´nez argue
that the programme was born of a political commitment by the Spanish
Foreign Minister, Serrano Sun˜er, to provide «voluntarios para el frente,
voluntarios para las fa´bricas» (volunteers for the front, volunteers for the
factories)4. Reichsmark credits from the programme, as with many others,
were to be used for the payment of Spanish debts to Germany. In this con-
text, this becomes nothing more than one of several Spanish-German pro-
grammes established at the time, including the Division Azul (Blue Division),
an 18,104-man contingent which fought on the Eastern Front (Kleinfeld and
Tambs 1979, p. 355).
It is also one of the many labour programmes set up in Europe as part of
the German hunt for labour. Among the neutrals, Switzerland provided a
maximum of some 1,800 workers through a free trade and transit area
known as the Grenzgebiet; although these numbers declined to less than half
this figure by late 1943 (Golson 2012, chapter 7). Other German-occupied
and -oriented countries supplied workers, initially under similar voluntary
programmes and eventually via conscription. The closest comparison is with
the Italian programme, which began to transfer labourers to Germany in
September 1939 (Homze 1967). Over time, the proportion of foreigners in
the German labour force grew from about 1 per cent in 1939 to more than
8 per cent in 1941 and eventually more than 20 per cent in 1944 (Klemann
and Kudryashov 2012, p. 120). However, the Spanish programme marked the
pinnacle of close political relations between the two countries. Spanish
government insistence on its workers having similar treatment to that of
workers from other Axis countries led to poor diplomatic relations and
fraught negotiations. Germany’s political and economic weaknesses eroded
the reasons for political cooperation and the repayment of Spanish debts.
The desired number of Spaniards never arrived and the official programme,
suspended several times, officially ended in 1943 (Bowen 2000, pp. 127-142).
Spanish workers were treated poorly, but conditions were not so bad as to
prevent many from going to Germany outside the programme. These Spaniards
suffered inferior work conditions, a lack of access to German social welfare
programmes, shorter rations and harsher workplace penalties (Bowen 2006,
pp. 119-120). In response to the complaints regarding bad conditions, the
3 Approximately 1/5000th of the German wartime workforce (Homze 1967, p. 232).
4 Garcı´a Pe´rez (1988, pp. 1031-1065). Subsequently partially republished in Garcı´a Pe´rez
(1992), Rodrı´guez Jime´nez (2002, p. 186).
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Spanish government intermittently suspended the official programme over
the course of the first year. The traditional diplomatic view has been that the
flow of workers to Germany was interrupted because of conditions there
(Garcı´a Pe´rez 1988, pp. 1049-1054). However, new employment statistics
presented in this paper suggest that workers continued to go to Germany in
1942/1943, despite these poor conditions and even without the Spanish state
sponsorship that covered transportation and equipage costs (see Table 1).
Thus, while conditions did reduce the incentives for workers to make the
journey, many continued to do so.
In closing the worker programme, the Spanish government was going
against its own economic interests. This paper updates the existing literature to
reveal that the Spanish government’s monetary transfer department was
profiting from the programme. It was earning a previously unnoticed transfer
fee on the funds remitted, enough to exceed its costs; this was in addition to the
use of the reichsmark earnings to bring down the debt to Germany. The 1941
Agreement called for the Spanish and German governments to remit the exact
worker payment at the official rate5. However, the Spanish government’s
transfer bureau did not remit the full transferred funds to the Comisio´n
interministerial para el envio de trabajadores a Alemania (Inter-ministerial
Commission for Workers in Germany - CIPETA) but took an illicit commission
from the transfers before they reached the workers. This reduced workers’
earnings, changed incentives and made it appear that the CIPETA programme
was losing money. From an overall perspective and taking these details into
account, the resulting «profit» per 1 peseta remitted amounted to 0.27 pesetas,
taking all costs into account (see Tables 2 and 4). This explains why the Spanish
government was content to allow the monetary transfer facility to continue until
December 1945, after the end of the war, ensuring that it could still collect
commissions and pay off its debt to Germany.
The size, activities, composition and profitability of the programme support
two findings; one domestic and one with regard to foreign policy. On the
domestic front, this monetary arrangement allowed the programme to satisfy
Spain’s internal political balance, enabling the programme to persist for a period.
From a foreign policy perspective, the end of official state-sponsored worker
recruitment must be attributed to Allied pressure and the changing Spanish
attitude towards Germany, starting as early as 1942 (Bowen 2000, p. 157ff).
Different Spanish government departments and interest groups (such as
the Falange) were given incentives to support Franco’s authorised limited
military, economic and political collaboration with Germany. Paul Preston
and Wayne Bowen suggest that there were significant tensions within
the Spanish government which Franco placated (Bowen 2000, chapter 4).
Bowen portrays Franco as holding together a fractious coalition, which
5 Archives of the Ministerio de Asunto Exteriores y de Cooperacio´n (AMAEC), R2225/7,
Agreement dated August 22, 1941.
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included a government composed of the Falange (31.6 per cent of government
positions), representatives of the armed forces (25.1 per cent), Alfonsine
monarchists (21.6 per cent), Catholic activists (14.4 per cent) and Carlist
monarchists (6.6 per cent) (Bowen 2006). The Falange and other Nazi-allied
TABLE 1
SPANISH WORKERS EMPLOYED IN GERMANY SHOWN BY QUARTER,
SEPTEMBER 1941 TO JUNE 1945: SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY (MAE),
GARCI´A PE´REZ AND GOLSON ESTIMATES
Month year MAE estimates Garcı´a Pe´rez estimates Golson estimates
December 1941 4,000 5,300
March 1942 6,300
June 1942 7,850
October 1942 8,242 6,253 9,542
December 1942 4,263 7,553
March 1943 4,674 4,674 5,974
June 1943 5,700 6,637
September 1943 6,300 7,700 7,300
December 1943 6,300 6,900
March 1944 4,012
June 1944 2,800 2,241
September 1944 1,109
December 1944 1,000 978
March 1945 656
June 1945 11
Notes: For October 1942, Garcı´a Pe´rez acknowledges the 8,242 figure from the Ministerio de Asuntos
Exteriores (MAE), but discounts 1,989 workers who were being repatriated by the Germans for various
reasons. Golson’s estimates use the higher figure since the workers were still in Germany. See Garcı´a Pe´rez
(1988, p. 1047); AMAEC R2225/1, memo dated February 5, 1942.
Sources: Garcı´a Pe´rez (1988, p. 1057). AMAEC R2225/7, letter from Larcocino Corride to MAE, dated
October 25, 1943; AMAEC R2225/7, memo, «CIPETA: Estado de las remesas de ahorros de salarios enviados
por los productores a sus familias»; AMAEC R2225/2, memo, «Negociado de Transferencias»; AMAEC R2225/
7, memo, «Negociado de Transferencias: Estadistica del An˜o 1945»; AMAEC R2225/1, «Apunte para el Sr.
Ministro, MAE», date February 5, 1943; AMAEC R2225/1, letter to Embasador von Stobrer in Madrid,
January 9, 1942; AMAEC R2225/1, CIPETA Memo, dated March 12, 1943; NARA RG242/T-77/243/986879-
986880, Wehrwirtschafts- und Ru¨stungs-Amt (Wi Ru¨ Amt), report marked «VO/Wi Ru¨ Amt und Dienstab Ost
bei OKH/Gen Ou», dated March 13, 1942; NARA RG242/T-77/243/987071-72, memo marked «Vermerk fu¨r
Chef», dated November 10, 1941; NARA RG242/T-77/243/986882, memo entitled «Stand der Anwerbung
ausl. Arbeitskra¨fte», marked Rue IVd, dated January 19, 1942; NARA RG242/T-77/243/986880, memo
entitled «Arbeitseinsatz von Auslandern im Reichsgebiet», dated March 13, 1942.
SPANISH CIVILIAN LABOUR FOR GERMANY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR?
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History 149
domestic political organisations were trying to bring Spain into the war, while
the resistance of the others effectively threatened another civil war (Bowen
2000, pp. 77-80). In 1941, Franco probably saw this aid as the most that Spain
could offer Germany without angering the Allies. The Falange and similar
organisations, on the other hand, deemed these programmes the absolute
minimum permissible for a close ally (Bowen 2000, p. 103). Publicly accepting
such a programme mollified the Falange interests, while providing the Instituto
Espanol de Moneda Extranjera (IEME) and the Treasury with a small «profit»
was enough to ensure their cooperation. Meanwhile, administratively limiting
the programme ensured that Spain would not be dragged closer to Germany.
Allied pressure and the changing Spanish attitude towards Germany
starting in mid-1943 resulted in the closure of the programme. Allied-
Spanish relations during this programme can be divided into two stages with
the period from June 1940 to December 1941 in which this agreement was
concluded representing the apex of the Spanish-German relationship. During
this period, Germany promised Spain considerable quantities of goods and
benefits in exchange for Spanish entry into the war. In the later stage,
between January 1942 and August 1944, Anglo-American economic activity,
both sanctions and pre-emptive purchasing, caused a shift in the position of
the Spanish government enabling it to maintain a rivalry between the two
belligerents. Meanwhile, Germany weakened considerably as the war
was transformed slowly by the Soviet advantage on the Eastern Front and
Germany’s loss of North Africa and much of Italy. Although officially caused
by conditions in Germany, the stoppages coincided with an increasing shift
towards the Allies, including their two fuel blockades and a decree in March
1942 which opened the wolfram market to purchasing competition. The end
of the official programme came in summer 1943, after the fall of Mussolini in
July 1943, coinciding with the withdrawal of the Blue Division from the
Eastern Front and Spain’s shift from non-belligerency to neutrality (Golson
2012, pp. 128-147). Despite the fact that it was profitable in economic terms,
in its creation and termination the programme was essentially a political
matter. In addition to offering these two conclusions, this paper adds to the
existing literature by updating estimates for the number of workers, their
skill levels and remittances; it also provides the first estimates of the Spanish
costs incurred.
Before proceeding, it should be made clear that substantial shortcomings
beset any attempt to outline the Spanish-German civilian labour programme
accurately. The information from Spain provides some clues to the origins,
systems, expected profitability and long-term political intentions of the
programme, but it provides no insight into Franco’s thinking. Unfortunately,
some programme records were burnt in August 1943 when the Spanish
Embassy in Berlin was bombed (Garcı´a Pe´rez 1988, p. 1052). Subsequent
records were apparently lost in the invasion of Berlin when the Embassy was
abandoned. This problem has been partially mitigated by the surviving
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American and German records of the programme, but these records do not
provide the full picture. Most notably, the estimates of the number of
workers from 1943 to 1945 in this paper depend on the continuity in fre-
quency of workers’ transfers. It assumes that workers continued to remit
their earnings 7.73 times per year as they had done in 1942. Using this
method to project the figures for these years leaves open the possibility of
specific bias effects. An increase in the frequency of workers’ remittances
during this period could lower the number of workers; this increase could
have resulted, for instance, from black market activities in Germany.
2. EMPLOYMENT OVERVIEW
This section revises the employment figures from September 1941 to June
1945. Aiming at comprehensiveness, it includes all the Spaniards working in
Germany, both those formally recruited under the programme and those
who travelled as individuals, as all could use the remittance facilities and
were eligible for state-paid repatriation6. This study, in line with others,
excludes Spanish Republicans and Communists living in France (Garcı´a Pe´rez
1988; Bowen 2000; Rodrı´guez Jime´nez 2002, p. 119). Republicans put to work
in Germany, under the various German-French worker recruitment pro-
grammes, were typically taken forcibly from French refugee camps and had no
access to the Spanish government facilities (Vilanova 1969; Lindquist 1984).
Germany expected much of the Spanish worker programme. In April
1941, German government reports noted that Spain had as many as 500,000
unemployed7; ,100,000 civilians were expected to leave Spain for Germany
by mid-1942 and the Germans believed that 300,000-400,000 Spaniards
would finally relocate8. However, notwithstanding the German expectations,
only 8,250 Spaniards ever worked in Germany on this programme. If 1,300
Spaniards are added, those estimated to have worked independently in
Germany, the total is ,9,550 at any one time. An approximate total of 25,000
Spaniards were involved. In May 1943, when there were 36.5 million workers
in Germany, the highest total since 1939, the highest Spanish contribution
represented ,0.02 per cent of the German workforce (Homze 1967, p. 232);
this equals ,0.1 per cent of the Spanish workforce9.
Workers in the programme were recruited in Spain by combined teams of
Spanish and German officials. Workers were sent to the Spanish-French
border town of Iru´n to be kitted out before departing for Germany via France.
6 AMAEC R2225/1, undated pamphlet; AMAEC R2225/6; AMAEC R2225/1, letter dated
November 7, 1944, telegram dated January 8, 1945 and telegram dated March 26, 1945.
7 AMAEC R2225/1, undated pamphlet, p. 99; largely consistent with unemployment figures
reported in Mitchell, (1992 pp. 153 and 164).
8 NARA RG242/T-77/243/987071-72.
9 Catala´n Vidal, La economı´a espan˜ola, p. 54.
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Their cities of origin are shown in Figure 1. Their largely urban origins suggest
they would have had higher skill levels than average, as discussed below.
Although planned to be continuous, the supply of workers was recruited and
transported in three main phases: from October to December 1941, from spring
to November 1942 and from June to July 1943. The smaller number who
bypassed the state system had begun to work in Germany, using the transfer
system to remit their earnings to Spain.
This study offers the first quarterly figures for Spanish workers in
Germany, significantly expanding the limited number of post-December 1943
estimates in Garcı´a Pe´rez’s study. As seen in Table 1, apart from a period in
1942 when there was a number of independent Spanish workers in Germany,
the number of workers does not significantly differ from that of Garcı´a
Pe´rez’s original study (within 20 per cent). Figures from November 1941 to
September 1943 are based on information held by the Spanish and German
authorities; in Table 1, the data, which are taken directly from Spanish
government sources administering the programme, are labelled «MAE
Estimates»; estimates by Garcı´a Pe´rez are listed in the second column from
FIGURE 1
MAP OF SPAIN (INDICATING THE CITIES FROM WHICH THE LABOUR VOLUN-
TEERS ORIGINATED)
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the left. The right-hand column contains the results of the present study;
these estimates are typically higher than others as they include all the
Spaniards temporarily working in Germany, as described above.
Worker statistics from the end of 1943 through December 1945 are
reconstructed using monthly wage remittance statistics from Spanish
authorities. These statistics assume that workers continued to return money
to Spain as regularly throughout the remainder of the war as they had
in 1943. This represents an average of 7.73 transfers per annum for each
worker. Average wages varied during the war and cannot be used as a
benchmark. There seems to be no better method of estimating the number of
workers than to assume that they continued to transfer funds back to Spain
with the same frequency10.
The first phase of recruitment began in September 1941, but did not go as
smoothly as the negotiators had hoped. The Germans sought to recruit
24,000 workers immediately, including a relatively high proportion of
skilled labourers, but the Spanish total was only 5,00011. Barcelona, Madrid
and Huelva opened recruitment centres; further offices of the CIPETA were
later established in Barcelona, Seville, Valencia and other cities throughout
Spain. Thousands reportedly queued at these three offices in the first days
of recruiting12.
Five thousand workers left between mid-November 1941 and January
1942, after which shipments were halted amid reports of poor working
conditions in Germany13. The complaints singled out poor housing, long
hours and pay rates below the German wages for equivalent work; there were
also unresolved financial issues between Spain and Germany, including cost
reimbursements and provision for pensions, sick leave and other benefits14.
These complaints were put to the German authorities and recruiting halted
in late December 194115. Various outstanding items concerning conditions
and pay were resolved by spring 1942, when Spain resumed the programme;
by September 12 as many as 8,242 Spaniards were in Germany. However, it
must be admitted that of these about 1989 were awaiting return to Spain,
leaving only 6,253 by October 194216. The number declined by ,1,000 when
the agricultural labourers returned to Spain and was then further reduced at
the turn of the year.
10 See sources for Table 1. Note results are consistent with other authors’ findings.
11 AMAEC R2225/1, note dated August 29, 1941; memo dated September 22, 1941.
12 AMAEC R2225/1, reports dated October 9-10, 1941.
13 AMAEC R2225/1, reports dated October 9-10, 1941; NARA RG242/T-77/243/986882 memo
entitled «Stand der Anwerbung ausl. Arbeitskra¨fte», marked Rue IVd, dated January 19, 1942;
NARA RG242/T-77/243/986880, memo entitled «Arbeitseinsatz von Auslandern im Reichsgebiet»,
dated March 13, 1942.
14 AMAEC R2225/6 and R2225/1, correspondence dated between November 3, 1941 and April 9,
1943.
15 Archives of the General de la Administracio´n (AGA), T16256, memo dated February 24, 1942.
16 AMAEC R2225/1, dated February 5, 1943.
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The total declined precipitously in late 1942. The Germans complained
about both the low numbers and poor quality of the Spanish workers
received to date17. In what was interpreted by the Spanish authorities as
retaliation for the lack of new workers in the autumn of 1942, the Germans
suspended the Spaniards’ next Christmas vacation. This postponed the
workers’ annual holiday until after January 15, 1943. Over 40 per cent of the
workers (,650) who then returned to Spain refused to go back to Germany,
no doubt as a result of the poor conditions. The Spanish government refused
to enforce their contracts and did not forcibly return them18; it also suspended
its recruitment efforts. The loss of ,650 workers resulted in a decline to
4,700 workers by February 1943. This figure stands as the base number of
non-seasonal Spanish labourers in Germany until October/November 194319.
After trying to recruit workers through their Embassies and Consulates in
Spain, the Germans finally pressured the Spanish government to reauthorize
the recruitment programme from June 1943 (planning began in February
1943)20. The third wave of recruitment saw far fewer volunteers (Bowen
2000, pp. 187-188). Approximately 2,500 recruits left Spain for Germany
between March and June 1943 and the number in Germany in 1943 peaked
at ,7,200 between August and September of that year. By this point, the
political changes were clearly a factor; the number of CIPETA recruiting officers
had notably decreased, anticipating a smaller yield21. Competition for labour
within Spain is also a possible cause as the Spanish economy was improving
substantially. The number of recruits was commensurate with previous yields
and remained below expectations (Catala´n Vidal 1995, p. 111ff).
Late summer 1943 marks a turning-point in Spanish-German relations.
Allied pressure on Franco to withdraw his support for Germany then reached
its height. Losses in Spain’s military contingent, the Blue Division, mounted
as the German war on the Eastern Front became increasingly bleak (Kleinfeld
and Tambs 1979, pp. 324-339). In August 1943, the President of CIPETA
informally decided to repatriate as many Spanish civilian workers as possible,
purportedly due to poor conditions in Germany22. Two months later, in October
1943, to satisfy Allied demands, Franco re-declared Spanish neutrality and
ordered the withdrawal of Spanish support for Germany. Spain continued to
allow monetary transfers from workers still in Germany23.
17 AMAEC R2225/1, letter to dated January 9, 1942; AMAEC R2225/1, memo dated February 5,
1943.
18 AMAEC R2225/1, memo dated February 5, 1943.
19 AMAEC R2225/1, memo dated February 5, 1943 and Table 1.
20 AMAEC R2225/1, memos dated between May and July 1943; AMAEC R2225/1, memo dated
February 5, 1943.
21 AMAEC R2225/7, accounts of «CIPETA Oficinas en Espan˜a [Spanish CIPETA Offices] Ser-
vicio´ de Intervencio´n y Contabilidad [Service of Transfer and Accounting]».
22 AMAEC R2225/1, memo dated October 26, 1943.
23 For summary of relations at this point, see NARA RG107/160/921, memo dated March 24,
1944.
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In the short term, the Spanish government’s policy changes led to
increased numbers of workers. In the repatriation of the Blue Division from
the Eastern Front, ,1,000 of its 18,400 members decided to stay in Germany
for a time while the division was returned to Spain24. In the last quarter of
1943, this temporarily increased the number of workers to about 6,900.
After October 1943, Spanish authorities no longer recorded the number of
workers in Germany25. The only basis for assessment is the number of
monetary transfers made by each worker; wage rates themselves are believed
to have varied. Figures for the number of workers from late 1943 to May
1945 have been re-created on the assumption that workers continued to
remit their earnings with the same average frequency (7.73 times per annum)
as they had on average during 1943. These figures are adjusted to compen-
sate for the one-third who reportedly did not use the transfer system, and
smoothed using a 3-month moving average, to account for the large swings in
transfers as a result of communication breakdowns. After December 1943, the
new methodology used in this study suggests that ,4,000 workers were still in
Germany in March 1944, declining to 2,240 by June 1944; the figure halved
again by September, with only 1,100 workers left in Germany. Problems in
transporting workers from Germany to Spain after the Allied invasion of
southern France no doubt hindered repatriation and slowed this decline; it
resulted in,980 workers remaining in December 1944 and 650 by March 1945,
based on the above figure of 7.73 transfers per annum per worker.
As this section has demonstrated, the number of civilian Spanish workers
never reached the figures desired by the German government. Although the
Germans had wanted 400,000 workers, they received no more than about
9,550. A significant number of workers also travelled outside the official
programme. This is the first study to corroborate the 9,000 Spanish workers
reported by Germany in 1943, a figure which lies between the maxima
reported by Garcı´a Pe´rez and Rodrı´guez Jime´nez of 8,250 and 10,569,
respectively26.
3. WORKER PROFILES
The Spaniards employed in Germany represented some of the most
productive elements of the Spanish labour force. There were three principal
groups of Spanish workers: full-year unskilled, full-year skilled and seasonal
24 NARA RG242/T-77/885/634561; NARA RG242/T-77/885/564575-564606; NARA RG242/T-77/
885/563485-563486 (Vadillo 1984). Estimates are based on changes in remittances; for discussion
on the repatriation of the Blue Division, see Kleinfeld and Tambs (1979, pp. 329-345).
25 AMAEC R2225/1; AMAEC R2225/7.
26 Imperial War Museum, Duxford (IWM-D) Foreign Documents (FD) 847/46, graph entitled
«Der Arbeitseinsatz ziviler Ausla¨nder nach der Staatsangeho¨rigkeit [Civilian Foreign Worker Statistics
by Citizenship];» Rodrı´guez Jime´nez 2002, p. 186; see also Table 2.
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agricultural workers. As part of their October 1941 effort, the Germans
sought to recruit a largely skilled group of workers from Spain: about 13,000
for construction, 6,000 for mining, 4,000 for metallurgical and 1,000 for
agricultural work27. Excluding temporary workers, Spanish labour con-
sistently included an above-average proportion of highly skilled workers
(Homze 1967, p. 235). As Figure 2 shows, the number of such workers in
Germany dwindled slowly over time; from correspondence by the British
Ambassador, holiday returns data and arrest records, the percentage of
Spanish labourers in Germany classified as skilled declined from 62 per cent
of the full-year workers from the start in December 1941 to 44 per cent by
the end of the war28. In comparison, it is believed that less than a quarter
of domestic Spanish workers were skilled. Unskilled/agricultural workers
FIGURE 2
SPANISH WORKERS IN GERMANY BY SKILL LEVEL,
SEPTEMBER 1941 TO JUNE 1945
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Sources: AMAEC R2225/1, letter from the British Ambassador, Arthur Tencken to Pelayo Garcia Olay,
MAE, dated January 9, 1942; NARA RG242/T-84/466/182-189, memo entitled «An das Sondergericht bei dem
Landgericht Berlin, 6PJs 1770/44 und 193 KLs 31/45»; AMAEC R2225/7, letter from Larcocino Corride to
MAE, dated October 25, 1943; NARA RG242/T-84/466/190-192, memo entitled «Stafsache, Sond. IV,
6 P.K.Ls. 541.44 (3194.44).»
27 AMAEC R2225/1, note dated August 29, 1941 and memo dated September 22, 1941.
28 AMAEC R2225/1, memos dated January 9, 1942 and February 5, 1943; NARA RG242/T-84/
466/190-192.
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suffered disproportionally from unemployment and should have been the
Spanish government’s logical targets for this programme29. The Spaniards
also contained a higher proportion of skilled workers than was typical of
foreign groups in Germany during the war, when 38.33 per cent of the
workers were skilled30. This section details the changes in the skilled,
unskilled and agricultural labour groups from Spain in Germany.
Many Spanish seasonal agricultural workers were recruited. Approxi-
mately 3,200 Spaniards went to Germany as temporary seasonal agricultural
workers from June to October 1942 and 2,600 from June to October 1943. In
both years, the number of workers increased dramatically in April and
peaked in September/October, when Germany’s farming season ended. These
swings can be attributed only to agricultural workers, because outflows of
long-term workers from Germany were strictly limited to the vacations set
in their contracts31. In 1942, the approximate trough to peak employment
difference was 3,200 workers or about 39 per cent of the peak workforce; in
1943, it was 2,600 workers or about 36 per cent of the total workforce. Note
that, as Figure 2 shows, in October/November 1943, ,1,000 members of the
Blue Division replaced the temporary agricultural workers who left then;
these members chose to stay in Germany when their division disbanded32.
Removing the temporary agricultural labour force establishes a base figure of
4,700 full-year workers, both skilled and unskilled, from January 1942 to
February 1944.
Of the full-year contract workers, three separate tests find that between
2,000 and 2,900 (44 per cent to 62 per cent) were working in skilled industrial
jobs, with the remainder fulfilling less skilled or full-year agricultural roles.
The first source for the number of skilled workers is a memo from the British
Ambassador to the head of the CIPETA, Pelayo Garcı´a Olay, concerning the
recruitment of skilled industrial workers from British mines owned by Rio
Tinto33; it covers the skill distribution of recruits at the end of 1941. In
November 1941, CIPETA recruited 216 men from Rio Tinto’s mines. Of
these, the Ambassador asserts that no fewer than 133 were regarded as highly
skilled and impossible to replace. This group contains a large cross-section
of mine workers, including drillers, transport operators of various kinds,
boilermen, furnace loaders, welders, electricians, pump operators and crane
drivers. The unskilled group includes telephone operators, apprentices,
labourers, carpenters, storekeepers and assistants of various kinds. The
Ambassador’s figures would probably have been biased so as to make his
29 See AMAEC R2225/1, correspondence from late 1941 on the employment situation in Spain.
There are no definitive statistics on skilled vs. unskilled labour in Spain during this period, in
particular regarding unemployment.
30 Homze (1967, p. 69); IWM-D FD847/46, chart.
31 AMAEC R2225/1, undated pamphlet.
32 See previous section on the disbandment of the Blue Division.
33 AMAEC R2225/1, letter dated January 9, 1942.
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point that highly skilled workers from British mines were being recruited for
the German war effort; but his figures suggest that ,62 per cent of those
recruited to German industries were highly skilled. Applying this figure to
the 4,700 permanent labourers in Germany between late 1941 and early
1942 would indicate ,2,900 as highly skilled and 1,800 with lower skills in
January 1942 (see footnote 33).
The second source of relevant data refers to the 1942/1943 holiday
period. As previously noted, skilled industrial workers (but not unskilled
agricultural workers) employed in Germany were allowed vacations in
Spain under the Spanish-German agreement. After their first year’s work,
they received 21 days’ vacation on full pay, excluding travel days34. Over the
1942/1943 holiday season, when Germany delayed their leave, records were
kept of those who eventually left for Spain; many chose not to return.
According to the Spanish figures, 2,191 workers, the highly skilled industrial
workers who alone were entitled to these holidays, left Germany in January
1943. This figure indicates that about 46 per cent of the 4,700 full-year
workers were involved; ,2,500, or 54 per cent, low- or non-skilled labour
remained35.
The percentage of skilled workers declined yet further. Despite a steep
decline after mid-1944, ,1,000 were still in Germany in December 1944.
A fragmented set of German diplomatic correspondence regarding Spaniards
arrested in Berlin in late 1944 to early 1945 provides some insight into the
composition of those Spaniards who remained. The November 1944 record
of Spaniards prosecuted for crimes includes complete profiles for nine
Spaniards. Of the nine, six are skilled labourers and three are listed merely as
Arbeiter (labourers); the six skilled workers comprise two electricians, two
mechanics, one welder and one mechanical fitter36. The January 1945 arrest
record includes a further nine subjects, only seven of whom, one skilled
labourer and six unskilled, were Spaniards who featured as part of this
programme37. The skilled man was a mechanic while the remainder com-
prised 3-day labourers, two waiters and one busboy38. Sixteen is hardly an
ideal sample size for the ,1,000 workers in Germany at this time; however,
these are the only relevant statistics available. Of the sixteen, seven were
skilled and nine unskilled; this suggests ,44 per cent skilled and 56 per cent
unskilled. When these figures are applied to the ,1,000 Spanish workers
still in Germany around the end of December 1944, they indicate ,440
skilled workers and 560 unskilled. Note that this late figure for skilled
34 AMAEC R2225/1, undated pamphlet, pp. 99-101.
35 AMAEC R2225/1, memo dated February 5, 1943.
36 NARA RG242/T-84/466/190-192; NARA RG242/T-84/466/182-189.
37 Two are excluded: one is Portuguese and the other a Spanish Republican (Rotspanier) who
had been living in France before working in Germany. The remaining seven had lived in Spain
before working in Germany.
38 NARA RG242/T-84/466/182-189.
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workers is still above the maximum 38.33 per cent of German skilled workers
during the war39.
As the results suggest, the Germans were increasingly forced to accept
fewer skilled and more unskilled Spanish workers in order to maintain
recruitment figures. Given the rapidly improving Spanish economy and the
gradually worsening situation in Germany, it is only logical that those with
most to gain in Spain (i.e. the skilled workers) returned there before others
with poorer job prospects.
The gender profile of the workers suggests an overwhelming male
majority. German political ideology generally frowned on women in the
workplace, resulting in a disproportionate recruitment of Spanish men over
women (Koonz 1987; Elling 1978, pp. 11-22). The number of Spanish women
working in Germany at the outset of the programme was low and declined
steadily40. Of the 1,300 Spanish workers in Germany before the formal
programme began in December 1941, 16 per cent were female and 84 per
cent male41. As the German labour recruitment programme was specifically
geared to younger males, it is reasonable to assume that no women left
for Germany between October 1941 and January 1944. As a result, at the
September 1943 peak, only 3 per cent of the total Spanish labour contingent
in Germany is estimated to be female. The skill and gender statistics are
important for determining the wages to be expected, since in Germany
females were paid substantially less than males.
4. TRANSFERS
One of the most important aspects of the August 1941 Spanish-German
agreement was the currency exchange system known as the «Arbeiter Son-
derkonto» (The Workers’ Special Account). This clearing system enabled
workers to send funds home from Germany despite the currency embargoes,
allowing Spaniards working in Germany to remit their reichsmark earnings
in Spanish pesetas to Spain. Without this transfer system the programme
would have been unable to recruit many workers, since only Spaniards who
were willing to accept payment in blocked reichsmarks would have worked
in Germany. The official rates agreed in August 1941 were particularly gen-
erous to the workers and penalised the government (for this particular pro-
gramme), due to the overvaluation of the peseta against the reichsmark
(a value which persisted because of Spain’s net debtor position)42. However,
available statistics indicate that the Spanish exchange commission, the
39 Homze (1967, p. 69). IWM-D FD847/46, chart.
40 This excludes Spanish nurses and other hospital personnel working in Germany as part of
the Division Azul.
41 NARA RG242/T-77/243/985921-22.
42 NARA RG242/T-77/556869, memo dated June 10, 1944; (Leitz 1996, pp. 133-134).
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IEME, took a commission from these transfers before passing the funds on
to CIPETA for payment to the workers, improving its own position in this
respect. This commission was in violation of the August 1941 agreement,
which called for remittances to be paid at the official rate43.
The mechanics of the Arbeiter Sonderkonto system were unfavourable to
Spanish workers who wanted to send all their earnings, minus expenses
incurred in Germany, back to Spain. As Figure 3 indicates, all funds had to
be sent to a clearing account in favour of the Spanish government44, which
received a credit to its clearing account in Germany; the Spanish exchange
authority, the IEME, paid a lesser amount to CIPETA, as detailed below. The
Spanish Treasury, on behalf of CIPETA, then paid the worker’s family an
equivalent amount in Spanish pesetas at the official exchange rate from the
state budget. When workers returned to Spain, they had to submit any
Reichmarks or Rentenmarks held in cash at the French-Spanish border
(where German control ended) for exchange, and the marks were remitted
FIGURE 3
SPANISH WORKERS’ EARNINGS: TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
FROM GERMANY TO SPAIN
Sources: Deutsche Arbeitsfront (Amt fu¨r Arbeitseinsatz) (1941): Sammlung der Bestimmungen u¨ber den
Einsatz ausla¨ndischer Arbeiter in Deutschland, p. 99. AMAEC R2225/1, letter dated October 25, 1941.
43 AMAEC, R2225/7, Agreement dated August 22, 1941.
44 AMAEC R2225/7, pamphlet, pp. 99-101.
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to Spain45. The Spanish government charged no commission for these
transfers46. However, this system did not function entirely as desired.
According to Spanish Foreign Ministry information, only about two-thirds of
the workers transferred their earnings in cash47. Official Spanish surveys
suggest the rest remitted their German earnings to Spain as consumer goods,
illustrated by the left-hand pathway shown in Figure 348.
As the figures in Table 2 show, between September 1941 and December 1945
about 122.8 million pesetas’ worth of earnings were remitted from Germany to
Spain through the Arbeiter Sonderkonto system. CIPETA received 90.8 million of
these pesetas for transfer to the workers; this represents 427 pesetas per worker-
month. The funds retained by the government total over 31.9 million pesetas or
25.9 per cent of the total amount remitted from Germany. The net value of the
transfers just exceeds an average of 0.17 per cent of the Spanish annual GDP in
wartime (Prados De la Escosura 2003, p. 288).
The Arbeiter Sonderkonto transfer statistics reveal general trends. Payments
to workers in 1942, the programme’s first full year, represent about one-seventh
of the total; 1943, the peak year of transfers, saw almost exactly half and 1944
about one-third overall. Figure 4 shows the remittances to workers on a
monthly basis. As the chart illustrates, total payments steadily increased
from December 1941 to December 1942; they then slowed with the return of
TABLE 2
TRANSFERS FROM GERMANY TO SPAIN, 1941-1945
Year
IEME transfers
(pesetas)
CIPETA payments to
workers (pesetas)
Number of
transfers
1941 3,544,074 3,931,343 N/A
1942 17,597,169 12,687,015 24,202
1943 58,034,475 44,734,638 38,164
1944 40,262,184 30,914,362 19,855
1945 3,291,476 1,841,297 1,656
Total 122,792,378 90,810,361 N/A
Notes: The transfers began in September 1941, before the Spanish programme workers actually arrived
in Germany; they were made by volunteer, non-programme workers already in Germany. Payments
continued through December 1945.
Sources: AMAEC R2225/2, memo, «Negociado de Transferencias»; AMAEC R2225/7, memo,
«Negociado de Transferencias: Estadı´stica del An˜o 1945; Banco de Espan˜a, IEME, libros 22861, 22862,
22866 and 22868 ‘‘Rentas de Trabajo’’ (reported in Pounds Sterling and converted at the official rate)».
45 AMAEC R2225/7, pamphlet, pp. 99-101; AMAEC R2225/1, letter dated January 9, 1942.
46 AMAEC R2225/7, agreement.
47 AMAEC R2225/1, memo dated October 26, 1943.
48 AMAEC R2225/7, letter from Larocino Corride to MAE dated October 25, 1943.
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seasonal labour to Spain and recovered in spring 1943. Remittances reached a
peak in January 1944. The holiday period at the end of 1944 interrupts what is
otherwise a steady decline in the 3-month moving average of transfers after
September 1943.
The extent to which the system actually accounted for all transfers is,
however, less than clear. According to the August 1941 agreement, it should
have dealt with all funds from Spanish workers, allowing the Spanish gov-
ernment to obtain valuable reichsmark foreign exchange and lower its
debts49. However, according to a Foreign Ministry memo dated October 26,
1943, only two-thirds of the Spaniards in Germany used the banking system
for remittances50. The CIPETA figures suggest that a third of Spaniards in
Germany either spent all their earnings in Germany or transmitted funds to
Spain by methods other than bank transfers51. Spanish Foreign Ministry
FIGURE 4
MONTHLY PAYMENTS BY CIPETA TO SPANISH WORKERS,
SEPTEMBER 1941 TO DECEMBER 1945
Sources: AMAEC R2225/2, memo, «Negociado de Transferencias,» AMAEC R2225/7, memo,
«Negociado de Transferencias: Estadistica del An˜o 1945.»
49 AMAEC R2225/7, agreement dated August 22, 1941.
50 AMAEC R2225/1, memo dated October 26, 1943.
51 AMAEC R2225/7, letter dated October 25, 1943.
ERIC GOLSON
162 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
documents suggest that in the early months of the programme some workers,
on returning to Spain, were remitting their funds in the form of purchased
goods. Because of the difficulty of carrying large quantities of luggage or heavy
consumer items on the long train journey, the transported items probably
consisted of liquor, cigarettes or other small expensive items obtainable only on
the German black market; due to shortages, they could resell these in Spain at
cost or even above. Another complicating function is the commission taken by
the Spanish government transfer department, the IEME, in the exchange pro-
cess; but the precise effects of this 25.9 per cent commission are unknown. The
actual earnings attributable to work are not available; we have to assume, but
without any confirmation, that the transfers reflect work-related earnings52.
The statistics may also be affected by black market activities and wage
inflation. As the war dragged on, unofficial prices and wages rose quickly in
Germany, but remained comparatively low in Spain. According to the written
records, many Spanish workers took advantage of black-market activities to sell
Spanish commodities to the Germans, using the transfer system to remit their
illegal black-market earnings to Spain. When discussing the problem of illicit
earnings and remittances, the Spanish Foreign Ministry officials used large and
dramatic examples to highlight the potential costs to the Spanish state and to
dramatise the level of illegal activities. For example, a Spaniard could carry coffee
to Germany, exploiting the wide price difference between the two countries. It
was estimated that a worker could carry twenty kilos of coffee from Spain to
Germany after a vacation, which at 450 reichsmarks per kilo could net 9,000
reichsmarks on the German black market. At the 1943 exchange rate of 4.24
pesetas per reichsmark, this sale would yield ,37,800 pesetas in income,
equivalent to about 7 years of regular earnings in the Spanish labour programme.
These illegitimate earnings could have been remitted through the Arbeiter Son-
derkonto system, potentially inflating the perceived total of wages earned.
Despite concern, Spain did almost nothing to limit the transfer of illegiti-
mate funds. As Table 3 shows, the Spanish government had blocked only
0.38 per cent of the transfers (by value) at the end of the programme53. Such a
low percentage suggests that the government was not sufficiently concerned to
take action. There are no statistics to indicate the actual levels of illicit transfers
or the effects of the commission system, but, officially at least, the effects are
believed to be quite small.
5. A FINAL ACCOUNTING
The final accounts of the Spanish worker programme show that the Spanish
government was profiting overall from the labourers it sent to Germany.
However, different departments of the Spanish state benefited or lost, perhaps
52 AMAEC R2225/7, letter dated October 25, 1943, p. 2.
53 AMAEC R2225/1, memo dated October 26, 1943.
SPANISH CIVILIAN LABOUR FOR GERMANY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR?
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History 163
explaining why some were in favour of it and others against. The Spanish
Treasury, led in 1941 by Joaquin Benjumea, was hostile towards CIPETA on the
basis of his belief that the programme would be a net expense for Spain. In
October 1941 he refused to disburse funds for CIPETA until an intervention
from the Council of Ministers, which controlled the Spanish government. It was
ultimately the IEME and the Treasury, which benefited from this worker
programme, through the transfer commissions; although it is not possible to
establish a quid pro quo for the release of the initial funds and the approval
of the commissions system using existing sources. CIPETA and the Foreign
Ministry ultimately had to pay its costs, but did not receive the benefits of the
transfer commissions. However, in the following analysis, we consider the
Spanish government as one for the purposes of this paper.
Income from Germany paid to the IEME totalled 122.8 million pesetas. The
IEME transferred 90.8 million pesetas to CIPETA. Against this, there were two
tiers of costs: workers’ remitted salaries of 90.8 million pesetas, which were
subsequently paid from the IEME to CIPETA (an identical amount was credited
to the German loan to Spain). This left IEME, and ultimately the Spanish
Treasury, with a «profit» of 32.0 million pesetas. Other programme expenses in
excess of German government reimbursement were paid directly by CIPETA
and came to 7.2 million pesetas, as outlined in Table 4. When combined with
the workers’ salaries paid from the state budget, the total costs to the Spanish
state were 98.0 million pesetas or 0.68 per cent of an average year’s wartime
spending by Spain (Table 4; Prados De la Escosura 2003, p. 453). Once the 122.8
million pesetas received by the Spanish state are credited, a «profit» of 24.8
million pesetas remains; this is equivalent to 0.17 per cent of Spain’s annual
wartime spending (Table 4; Prados De la Escosura 2003, p. 453).
Expenses. Although recruitment, basic equipment and transportation
within Spain and inspections in Germany were meant to be covered by
German expense reimbursement, the Spanish government in effect became
responsible for most of these expenses and several additional items. To begin
TABLE 3
TRANSFERS WITHHELD AND UNDER INVESTIGATION, DECEMBER 31, 1945
Status Number of transfers withheld Amount (Pesetas)
Blocked 130 220,401
Pending additional information 82 129,770
Total 212 350,171
As percentage of total transfers 0.25 0.39
Sources: AMAEC R2225/7, memo «Comisio´n interministerial para el envio´ de trabajadores espan˜oles a
Alemania» dated January 1946; AMAEC R2225/7, table entitled «Negociado de Transferencias: Estadı´stica
del An˜o 1945».
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TABLE 4
FINAL ACCOUNTING OF THE HISPANO-GERMAN CIVILIAN LABOUR PROGRAMME (IN PESETAS)
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Unallocable Total
Income:
Credits for equipment returned 551.841 1.747.385 1.336.985 186.937 3.823.147
Credits for unused items held in ware-
houses, Hendaye
714.200 714.200
Credits for train tickets refunded 0 8.059 5.136 570 13.765
Reimbursed expenses — credit from Ger-
many
332.410 332.410
Reimbursed expenses — other spanish
government entities
184.493 184.493
Advance payments 91.835 33.827 5.102 307 131.071
Transfers withheld 350.170 350.170
Totals 332.410 551.841 1.755.444 1.342.121 187.507 898.694 5.549.257
Expenses:
Personnel in Spain — salaries 115.860 564.818 615.244 555.360 157.495 2.008.778
Personnel in Spain — benefits 35.327 105.658 74.025 18.741 1.812 235.562
Personnel in Germany — salaries 26.983 834.243 946.218 514.579 108.500 2.430.524
Personnel in Germany — benefits 0 36.152 39.972 9.808 1.649 87.582
Materials — purchased in Spain 116.816 95.278 85.437 50.300 15.908 363.740
Materials — purchased in Germany 3.230 137.141 136.740 140.290 1.297 418.698
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TABLE 4 (Cont.)
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Unallocable Total
Materials — acquisition of equipment for
workers
2.475.479 2.208.627 397.444 0 0 5.081.550
Transportation expenses within Spain 399.417 325.349 228.595 4.679 35.951 993.991
Other expenses in Spain (including
employee transport)
155.395 1.030 1.825 640 0 158.890
Other expenses in Germany (including
transport)
8.315 29.086 43.797 6.497 6.334 94.029
Other — transportation billed by RENFE
in 1947
437.174 437.174
Other — Hacienda expenses, billed in 1946 332.190 332.190
Uncategorized expenses 87.667 87.667
Total expenses 3.336.822 4.337.382 2.569.297 1.300.894 328.946 857.031 12.730.373
Total income less expenses 27.181.117
Total salaries paid to workers 290.810.361
Total costs to Spanish state 297.991.478
Sources: Ministerio de Hacienda: Direction General de Aduanas (1941): Estadistica del Comercio Exterior de Espana, 1941. AMAEC R2225/7, memo
marked, «Negociado de Transferencias: Recibos Pendientes de Despacho» from Servicien de intervencio´n y contabilidad, CIPETA, dated January 1946.
AMAEC R2225/7, memo from Subsecretario, Presidencia del Gobierno, dated November 8, 1947. AMAEC R2225/7, memo from MAE to RENFE dated July
10, 1947. AMAEC R2225/7, «CIPETA Oficinas en el Extranjero», and CIPETA Oficinas en Espan˜a», Servicio de Intervencio´n y Contabilidad.
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with, it organised and transported the workers to the Spanish border where
they were given clothing, footwear, rations for the journey and passports.
Spanish workers were, however, not equipped with sufficient heavy winter
clothing to survive the long, harsh German winters; from the autumn of
1942, the Germans did not supply these items but left Spain to do so. Food
shortages led the Spanish Embassy in Berlin to request additional food for
distribution to the Spanish workers in Germany. The clothing, boots and
other equipment cost Spain just over half a million pesetas net after crediting
for equipment returned to the warehouses during repatriation and at the
time of liquidation54. Although it eventually made this deficit up with
transfer commissions, under the August 1941 agreement, it could only claim
reimbursement of up to 42.40 pesetas per worker for reasonable expenses55.
Apart from the fixed German government reimbursement, there was no
additional private or public reimbursement of these CIPETA expenses.
Other expenses included a billing in 1946 for excess transportation
costs56. Several memos indicate the Germans failed to return Spanish
workers to the border station at Iru´n, but gave them tickets to the German
border with France instead; the Spanish state ultimately purchased several
thousand pesetas’ worth of French, Belgian and Swiss train tickets to repatriate
these workers57. Transportation cost altogether some 1.4 million pesetas which
was billed by the national train operator, RENFE, through 194758.
After credits for the returned equipment and train tickets are recorded
against the related expenses, the actual income from withheld payments and
reimbursement is small (see Table 4). The income consists mostly of with-
holdings from the transfer programme and reimbursed expenses. The largest
credit comes from transfers withheld and never paid because the recipients
could not be traced and/or the funds were blocked as illegitimate earnings;
these withholdings totalled 350,000 pesetas59. Reimbursements include the
sum of 332,000 pesetas, which Germany advanced to Spain in September
194160. Other Spanish departments reimbursed CIPETA for various expenses,
totalling some 184,500 pesetas in the course of the programme. Income for the
reimbursement for advance payments, of which no description is available,
totalled 131,000 pesetas61. These credits were less than the expenses.
As seen in Table 4, total income (including reimbursements and
reclaimed equipment) from the programme came to 5.5 million pesetas and
54 AMAEC R2225/7, accounts.
55 AMAEC R2225/7, agreement dated August 22, 1941.
56 AMAEC R2225/2, letter dated February 13, 1946.
57 AMAEC R2225/2, see memos and bills for various expenses dated between July 21, 1942 and
July 10, 1947.
58 AMAEC R2225/2, memo dated July 10, 1947.
59 AMAEC R2225/2, memo dated January 1946.
60 AMAEC R2225/7, memo dated November 8, 1947.
61 AMAEC R2225/7, accounts.
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total expenses to 12.7 million pesetas; as a result, the direct programme costs
were 7.2 million pesetas or about 0.05 per cent of an average year’s state
spending in wartime (Prados de la Escosura 2003, p. 453). Combined with
employee expenses of 90.8 million, total Spanish state expenditure for the
programme reached 98.0 million pesetas.
As the structure of the agreement and these final accounts suggest, by
agreeing to organise, equip and monitor the Spanish workers going to
Germany, the Spanish state committed itself to spending millions of pesetas. As
previously indicated, it could only claim reimbursement for reasonable expen-
ses of up to 42.40 pesetas per worker. As seen in Table 4, actual expenses per
worker were substantially higher: during the active periods of recruitment from
November 1941 to October 1943, there were ,25,000 individual workers62.
Total net programme expenditures of 7.8 million pesetas for 25,000 workers
imply a net expenditure of ,316 pesetas per worker, far exceeding the 42.40
peseta credit. As a result, the German contribution merely offset, but never fully
reimbursed the expenses to CIPETA. Had the programme run to its originally
expected size, CIPETA would have spent millions of additional pesetas. This
gives an added reason for the early suspension of recruitment by CIPETA while
the flow of remittances continued to be permitted.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The Spanish government offered Germany workers and then minimised
the numbers, which it allowed to go. This change must be attributed to Allied
diplomatic efforts to limit Spanish-German cooperation. The Spanish gov-
ernment’s mediocre recruitment efforts, the low number of actual recruits
and the withdrawal of the recruiting officers in 1942 reveal clear choices by
the Spanish government to limit the size of the programme, despite publicly
indicating otherwise. This was despite the «transfer commissions» collected
by the Spanish government. The traditional diplomatic view has been that
workers were not sent to Germany because of conditions there. However, the
new employment statistics presented in this paper suggest that workers
continued to go despite these poor conditions and even without Spanish state
sponsorship to cover their transportation costs. It was the Spanish state
rather than the workers themselves that wanted to stop providing labour to
Germany; parallel to this, the Spanish-German government negotiations
became more and more tempestuous. The Allies became more assertive in
their willingness to impose trade sanctions, on oil in particular. The timeline
of Spanish government actions suggests that the Allied diplomatic pressure
to end the programme was successful.
In ending its recruitment for the programme, the Spanish government
went against its own economic interests. Although the CIPETA organisation
62 Figures calculated from periods with net increases in workers from Table 1.
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that was responsible for the worker programme was losing money, the
Spanish transfer organisation, the IEME, was collecting sizeable commis-
sions. With the losses and costs offset by the transfer commissions, the
programme produced a modest overall «profit» of 24.8 million pesetas in favour
of the Spanish government. Moreover, the reichsmarks which it earned helped
to reduce Spanish debts with Germany. In addition to paying off the reichsmark
debts, the small net «profit» meant the Spanish government should have been
quite happy to encourage its citizens to work in Germany. Had the programme
run to the base figure of 100,000 workers in early 1942, the Spanish IEME
and Treasury could have earned about 1 per cent of its annual wartime
GDP through transfer commissions alone, assuming that the losses of CIPETA
were fully paid out of the commissions (Prados De la Escosura 2003, p. 453).
However, the Allied pressure clearly affected Spanish thinking. Therefore, the
decisions to suspend and eventually cancel the programme were taken against
Spain’s best short-term economic interests, but were able to distance Spain
from Germany for the post-war period.
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